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Among one of the most consistent claims made by the organizers and
supporters of the ‘Wehrmacht exhibition’1 has been that the ‘myth’ of
a ‘clean Wehrmacht’ took root in the Federal Republic of Germany in
the early 1950s, lasting well into the 1980s, only to have been finally
shattered by the exhibition itself in the mid-1990s. Although this the-
sis has very little to do with the actual content of the exhibition—
which examined the role of the Wehrmacht, and the army in particu-
lar, in co-operating with SS units in the final solution in the Soviet
Union, in executions of enemy personnel, and the extermination of
countless civilians through the device of declaring them to be parti-
sans—it is has been repeated consistently by a number of historians.2
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But as there have been no really convincing attempts to justify it on
the basis of a thorough examination of primary sources, it seems time
to subject this claim to closer scrutiny. This should not be miscon-
strued as an effort to take issue with the exhibition itself—which has,
after all, done much to revive interest in the Wehrmacht—but rather
as a call to historians to reconsider the issue of Vergangenheitsbe-
wältigung (‘coming to terms with the past’) during the 1950s, and
many of the unsubstantiated assumptions surrounding its undercur-
rents and dynamics, particularly those aspects relating to the way in
which Germans came to terms with their military past.
In seeking to identify trends in public perceptions of the
Wehrmacht, one route would seem to offer potentially high divi-
dends: the reaction to trials of former generals. In addition to the
Nuremberg trials, so far historians have shown some interest in the
trials by the British of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring in Venice in
1947 and Field Marshal Erich von Manstein in Hamburg in 1949.3
However, a series of trials of generals in Federal German courts for
the execution of soldiers under their command has been ignored
almost completely.4 In the only two attempts so far to examine the
prosecution of former members of the Wehrmacht before German
courts, not one of the six cases is even mentioned.5 This seems to be
a quite remarkable oversight. Yet, in many ways it merely reflects
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some of the broader failings of the research over the last decade on
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, not least the lack of attention which has
been paid to the effect of trials for National Socialist crimes on pub-
lic attitudes.6
The failure to take account of the generals’ trials, some of which
were major media events, can be explained on three counts. The first
cause lies in the initial direction of research into trials for National
Socialist crimes. Much of the early interest in post-war trials was in
what they could offer in terms of material for research into the crimes
of the Third Reich: the trials were seen only as a source of documen-
tary material.7 The second reason has been that where historians
have sought to examine reactions to post-war trials, the focus has
usually been on those proceedings directly involving the Holocaust,
or crimes committed specifically by the SS. Moreover, these works
have tended to focus more on the 1960s because the assumption has
been that only after the 1958 Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozeß, the trial in
Ulm of former members of a security task force, did the Federal
Republic turn its attention to dealing seriously with the past. Indeed,
some historians argue that the first Auschwitz trial in Frankfurt,
which began in December 1964, was an even more important land-
mark.8 The third reason is the claim in more recent studies that the
Wehrmacht was ‘whitewashed’ in the 1950s. The logic behind this
research appears to be that since German society was only interested
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Main, 1984), pp. 321–412. 
in constructing a myth of a ‘clean Wehrmacht’, there can be no point
in examining the confrontation with the military past in the 1950s as,
quite simply, none took place.9
In assessing ‘the generals’ trials’ in the Federal Republic, this arti-
cle will challenge the thesis that the ‘myth’ of an honourable
Wehrmacht dominated perceptions of the military past during the
1950s. It will be argued that some of the ‘generals’ trials’ represented,
in fact, an important chapter in the early attempts to come to terms
with the National Socialist past. The six individual cases, which
involved eight separate trials, saw one field marshal and five gener-
als appear in the witness-box. As they extended from 1948 to 1960,
they provide a means of analysing attitudes towards the Wehrmacht
throughout the 1950s, and thus offer a chance to put the hypothesis of
the ‘myth of a clean Wehrmacht’ to the test. The discussion will focus
on four areas: first, the need to view these cases as a trial category in
their own right; second, the significance of the trial of Theodor
Tolsdorff in June 1954; third, the three major trials which took place
in the second half of the 1950s; and fourth, the impact of the trials on
perceptions of the Wehrmacht and the way in which public attitudes
can be related to recent research on ‘victimization’ in West German
society.
I. Trials of Wehrmacht Generals, 1948–60: An Overview
What makes the eight ‘generals’ trials’ particularly instructive for the
analysis of changing perceptions is that they extended over three
clearly identifiable phases in the development of West German pub-
lic attitudes towards the war, the National Socialist state, and its
armed forces.
The first period in the evolution of post-war opinion towards the
Wehrmacht ran from the collapse of the Third Reich in May 1945 to the
emergence of the rearmament debate in late 1949. In this period there
was a form of ‘sullen resentment’ towards generals in particular. On
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the one hand they were seen as responsible for the ‘lost war’ yet, on
the other, the negative attitude towards them was an early manifes-
tation of a clear rejection of Nazi militarism. None the less, with
hunger rife and the major cities in ruins, it is hardly surprising that
the first two trials aroused very little interest: the proceedings against
General der Panzertruppe a.D. Hermann Balck before the Landgericht
Stuttgart in May 1948 led to a prison sentence of three years,10 those
against former Generalmajor Rudolf Hübner in November 1948 before
the Landgericht Munich to sentences totalling ten years.11
The second phase, which ran from approximately late 1949 to
mid-1954, was dominated by the government’s fight for sovereignty,
the question of rearmament, and the concomitant campaigns for the
release of Germans imprisoned by the Western Allies. The desire to
bargain for better conditions for the planned armed forces by refus-
ing to participate until the ‘so-called war criminals’ were released
saw this period marked by an overt aggressiveness towards any sug-
gestion that the crimes of the past needed to be confronted. This peri-
od saw two further cases against generals come before the courts. The
first, which was heard before the Landgericht Hamburg in January
1953, led to former Generalmajor Georg Benthack being pronounced
‘not guilty’ after two charges of manslaughter had been heard.12 His
case, in keeping with the atmosphere of the time, provoked almost no
media interest. The second trial, that of Generalleutnant a.D. Theodor
Tolsdorff in June 1954, which saw the general sentenced to three and
a half years’ prison by the Landgericht Traunstein,13 did by contrast
arouse considerable press interest, though it does conform very clear-
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10 III Kls 9/48, verdict, Landgericht (hereafter LG) Stuttgart, 25 May 1948,
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1 Ss 71/49, decision of Oberlandesgericht Munich, 30 June 1949, in Justiz und
NS-Verbrechen, iii, pp. 553–68, 569–73. 
12 (50) 18/52, verdict, LG Hamburg, 30 Jan. 1953, in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen,
x, pp. 295–336. 
13 Institut für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter IfZ), Gt 01.01, Ks 4/53, verdict, LG
Traunstein, 23 June 1954. 
ly to this phase of public opinion in so far as strong disapproval of
the verdict was expressed.
The third phase ran from approximately September 1954 to the
end of the rearmament debate in November 1960.14 It was marked by
a remarkable volte face in public opinion, a wave of anti-militarism
sweeping the country, clearly noticeable in the changed attitudes
towards the remaining four trials: that of Field Marshal Ferdinand
Schörner in Munich in October 1957 (verdict: guilty, four and a half
years);15 the following year the first retrial of Theodor Tolsdorff in
September 1958 (case abandoned under the provisions of the
Amnesty Law of 1954);16 then in August 1959 the proceedings against
General der Panzertruppe a.D. Hasso von Manteuffel in Düsseldorf
(verdict: guilty, eighteen months);17 and, finally, the second retrial of
Theodor Tolsdorff, again in Traunstein, in May/June 1960 (verdict:
not guilty).18 The first three were of particular significance for public
opinion.
Bearing in mind that all six cases involved prosecutions for illegal
executions, four general observations can be made. It is interesting to
note that, first of all, the prosecutions were almost exclusively for
actual or attempted manslaughter, only one of them, that of Hübner,
involving charges of murder and attempted murder, although on
these counts he was found not guilty. Second, of the eight trials, only
two ended with a verdict of not guilty: Georg Benthack in 1953, and
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xiv, pp. 359–90, 391–9. 
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xvi, pp. 389–414. 
Theodor Tolsdorff in 1960, the latter only as the result of a second
retrial. Third, as all these cases centred on execution orders issued by
the generals which were carried out on German nationals, serving in
the Wehrmacht, for military indiscipline—whether mutiny, drunken-
ness, or failing to open fire on the enemy—they cannot be consid-
ered, in a strictly legal sense, to be National Socialist crimes of vio-
lence. What made a crime ‘National Socialist’ was that it took place
in an area detached from the main combat zone. Fourth, the fact that
the central legal issues were essentially the same in all six cases sug-
gests that they can be approached as a homogeneous group, opening
up interesting comparative possibilities. Thus while each of these tri-
als concerned a specific incident or incidents, separated in time and
by geographical location, each of them revolved essentially around
the same problem in military law, and all of them occurred during
the final eighteen months of the war.
The cases all differed from the much more frequent proceedings
against junior officers and NCOs for executions quite simply because
the generals could not employ the principle of Befehlsnotstand. This
allowed a junior commander to justify his carrying out of an execu-
tion order if he had believed that failure to do so would have led to
his own execution.19 In the generals’ trials, this approach did not
have any serious legal basis as, in each case, the general gave the
order on his own initiative, as the final legal authority of his unit or
command area.20
However, the generals and their defence lawyers frequently cited
Paragraph 124 of the Military Criminal Code, the Militärstrafgesetz-
buch, this representing the principle of Befehlsnotrecht. The relevant
passage laid down that:
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19 On this issue, see H. Buchheim, ‘Das Problem des sogenannten
Befehlsnotstand aus historischer Sicht’, in P. Schneider and H. J. Meyer
(eds.), Rechtliche und politische Aspekte der NS-Verbrecherprozesse (Mainz, 1967),
pp. 25–37. 
20 Thus, if one wishes to make use of Herbert Jäger’s typologies of Nazi crim-
inality, the orders could be defined as acts of initiative, Initiativtaten.
However, there are no straightforward answers, and his category of acts gov-
erned by orders, Befehlstaten, could also be applied (Jäger, Verbrechen, pp.
44–75). 
(1) The actions undertaken by the commander in order to pre-
vent a violent attack by his subordinate, or to achieve obedi-
ence to his orders in the case of extreme emergency or imme-
diate danger, are not to be regarded as misuse of his authority.
(2) This applies also to the eventuality that an officer, in the
absence of other means, in order to maintain the necessary
obedience, finds himself in the position of having to make use
of weapons in order to resist a violent subordinate.21
This section of the Military Criminal Code was discussed by the court
in each of the cases, except that of Hübner, although in none of them
did it achieve any success. The situation provided for here was more
that of a disintegration of morale and discipline during a retreat or a
battle. None of the executions ordered by generals fitted this descrip-
tion; none of the decisions were made in the midst of a retreat or an
engagement with the enemy. In each instance, the court decided that
other means more appropriate could have been employed.
None the less, the generals also used specific orders issued by
Hitler, Keitel, and Himmler, known collectively as ‘catastrophe
orders’, to justify their decisions. In the case of Generalmajor Hübner,
he had been appointed in March 1945 as head of a ‘flying court mar-
tial’ by Hitler personally.22 In the Balck trial, while the court made
detailed reference to the increase in severity in the Military Criminal
Code in the last two years of the war, such as the 5. Verordnung zur
Ergänzung der Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung of 5 May 1944, it
could not be proved whether Balck had received an order directly
from Hitler at the end of September 1944, demanding that he use dra-
conian measures to restore discipline.23 In the Benthack trial, the
court accepted that the accused had been issued with an order per-
sonally by Hitler in September 1944 permitting him to take any
measures he thought fit to maintain discipline. The same order was
issued once again on 30 January 1945, a copy of which was available
to the court.24 In the Tolsdorff trial in June 1954, while the court
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rejected the applicability of § 124 of the Military Criminal Code to the
case out of hand, they took up the question of the ‘catastrophe
orders’, referring to the so-called Keitel order of 18 January 1945, and
Himmler’s subsequent ‘flag order’. In pursuit of the case, the court in
Traunstein later spent a considerable time attempting to establish the
exact wording of many of these orders.25 The Keitel order also played
a particularly prominent role in the trial of Ferdinand Schörner in
October 1957,26 while in the trial of Hasso von Manteuffel in August
1959 it was the ‘Führer Order No. 7’ of 24 February 1943 which stood
at the centre of the proceedings.27
Although it has been argued that these cases did not, strictly
speaking, represent instances of National Socialist crimes of violence,
the claim by both the accused and many of the military witnesses that
the ‘catastrophe orders’ had been legal, and the reliance on these
orders by generals as part of their defence, cast doubts on the claims
made by the General Officer Corps that the Wehrmacht had been
resistant to National Socialist ideology. Moreover, each of the trials
contained further potential to arouse negative reactions as, from the
experience of the war among Wehrmacht veterans, witnessing the exe-
cution of a German soldier, or, worse still, a comrade from one’s own
unit, was among the war’s most traumatic experiences. It provoked a
combination of outrage, shock, and fear, making it an experience
which was never forgotten.28 Whether and in what way the public,
journalists, jurors, or judges reacted to the implications of the details
of these cases depended on the particular phase of public opinion in
which the respective trial took place. The range of reactions possible
depended in turn upon what sort of associations and connotations
25
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28 E. Mende, Das verdammte Gewissen: Zeuge der Zeit. Jugend und Zweiter
Weltkrieg (Bergisch Gladbach, 1985), pp. 160–1, reporting on the carrying out
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the trial of a general held at any one point in time. And it is in the
reactions they produced that the real significance of ‘the generals’ tri-
als’ lies.
Of course, it should not be forgotten that the remarkable public
impact of the Tolsdorff trial in June 1954, the Schörner trial in 1957,
the first Tolsdorff retrial of September 1958, and the Manteuffel trial
of 1959 was to a considerable extent due to the fame of those on trial.
Tolsdorff was, after all, the most highly decorated infantry officer in
the Wehrmacht, Schörner had been a Field Marshal, while Manteuffel
had been not only a leading tank general, but also a member of the
Bundestag between 1953 and 1957. Thus the sentences which were
pronounced against all three, while interesting in terms of the legal
aspects of the respective cases, should not be used as a means of
measuring the success or failure of the trials. It is not, ultimately, of
central importance whether Manteuffel should have received more
than eighteen months, or whether four and a half years was too harsh
or too lenient a sentence for Field Marshal Schörner. What is signifi-
cant is that a field marshal could be brought to trial and sentenced,
and that a prominent veterans’ leader, and former member of parlia-
ment, could be convicted. In bringing these cases to trial the Federal
legal system opened a window on the behaviour of generals during
the war, instigating a public debate on the Wehrmacht which was not
tarnished with accusations of ‘victors’ justice’.29
During the period 1945 to 1949, attitudes towards the Wehrmacht
were, on the whole, conditioned by the first shock of the Nuremberg
trials, coupled with details from many of the Spruchkammer hearings,
which also saw generals called to answer for their actions during the
war. While there was an initial wave of condemnation of generals, by
the end of 1949 Nuremberg was beginning to be seen by many as
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Siegerjustiz (victors’ justice). In the second phase in the evolution of
public opinion towards the Wehrmacht and its generals, from late
1949 to mid-1954, attitudes were dominated by the public campaign
for the release of the ‘so-called war criminals’, and, because of the
drive for rearmament, by numerous politically motivated attempts to
portray the German military in a more positive light. Thus it was
hardly surprising that the trial of Georg Benthack, which falls square-
ly within this period, was more or less ignored. In a sense, then, by
the time the trial of Theodor Tolsdorff took place, in June 1954, two
reactions to trials of generals were possible: either a negative one,
which viewed the prosecution of generals as pandering to the
Western Allies and damaging to German interests; or one of suspi-
cion towards generals, coupled with anticipation as to what the
details of a case might reveal.30
II. The Tolsdorff Trial, June 1954
In terms of the development of post-war perceptions of the
Wehrmacht in Western Germany, the first three trials—those against
Balck, Hübner, and Benthack—are only significant in so far as they
make plain the lack of interest in such cases in the late 1940s and early
1950s. The trial of Theodor Tolsdorff in Traunstein in June 1954, how-
ever, represents a departure as it provoked considerable press cover-
age. Tolsdorff, a former Lieutenant-General, stood accused of man-
slaughter for having ordered the shooting of an army captain and
First World War veteran, Franz Xaver Holzhey.
The interest of many journalists seems to have been awakened for
three main reasons. First, Tolsdorff had enjoyed a meteoric career in
the Wehrmacht: having risen through the ranks after joining the army
in 1934, he was promoted to Lieutenant-General in March 1945. He
had been wounded fourteen times, and had won the Iron Cross in the
Polish Campaign, subsequently receiving the Knight’s Cross, with
swords, oak leaves, and diamonds, making him the most highly dec-
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orated infantry officer in the army.31 Second, the incident involving
Captain Holzhey had already been immortalized in one of the best-
sellers of the early 1950s, Ernst von Salomon’s Der Fragebogen. In the
fictional account, a retired officer living in the Bavarian village of
Eisenärzt removed a sign marking a military zone from in front of his
house, placing it 20 metres further down the road. Observed by an SS
officer, he was arrested and shot.32 However, it emerged that the inci-
dent on which the account was loosely based had not involved an SS
officer: the execution order had been given by Tolsdorff, and the
Captain had placed a Red Cross sign in the vicinity of a local hospi-
tal. Third, the appearance of two prominent military personalities in
court as witnesses—Field Marshal Albert Kesselring and former
General der Infanterie Friedrich Foertsch—was considered eminently
newsworthy.
However, contrary to what one might have expected, the court
delivered a verdict of guilty, sentencing Tolsdorff to three-and-a-half
years’ prison for what it saw as a capricious and arbitrary decision to
have the Captain shot without having given him a chance to explain
himself, or even having bothered to examine his papers. Tolsdorff
had argued in court that he had heard a ‘flag order’ being read and
assumed that this gave him the power to shoot those who displayed
white flags or neutrality symbols. The fact that Tolsdorff was con-
victed stands in stark contrast to the atmosphere of the time, made
only too clear in the press coverage of the trial. Quite apart from the
strong desire of the public prosecutor in Munich for a verdict of
guilty to be reached, there may, in fact, have been another factor
which influenced the decision of the jurors: the rolling Rs and boom-
ing voice of the accused quickly gave away his East Prussian origins,
and seem to have offended local Bavarian sensibilities.33
None the less, the press reaction to the verdict was disapproving.
Where reports offered no specific comment on the sentence, there
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Theodor Tolsdorff’, in Helden der Wehrmacht (Munich, 2000), pp. 204–205 is a
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32 E. von Salomon, Der Fragebogen (Hamburg, 1951), p. 442. 
33 See the trial coverage in the Traunsteiner Wochenblatt, 22, 23, and 25 June
1954. 
was at least the implication that the execution had been justified by
the need to continue resistance long enough to allow German units
from the east and the south to reach friendly lines, and thus
American rather than Russian captivity. Those papers which offered
specific comment on the verdict came down almost universally on
the side of the general. The non-partisan Kölner Stadtanzeiger began
its editorial by arguing that while the court had been able to recon-
struct the execution, ‘the atmosphere of the first days of May 1945
cannot be recreated in a courtroom’. One question which could not
be answered by the jurors was: ‘What is guilt, what is fate?’ While the
paper judged the execution to have been wrong, it was the political
system which Tolsdorff had fought for that was to blame, not the
general. An article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung asked how nine years
later, with the blown bridges now repaired and the destroyed farms
rebuilt, the chairman of the court and ‘the satisfied and well-fed
jurors’ could evoke the atmosphere of the final days, the strong
implication being that a civilian court was not in a position to pass
judgement on military command decisions. To find any criticism at
all of the verdict one has to go to the Communist paper, Freies Volk,
hardly representative even of minority left-wing opinion, which
blustered: ‘That is Bonn “democracy”, when a mass murderer like
Kesselring is allowed to appear as a defence witness in every trial of
fascist generals.’34
The written verdict which was passed on to the Generalstaatsan-
waltschaft (Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions) in Munich
after sentencing, and was thus the product of the deliberations of
court employees rather than the jury, shows that the legal officials in
Traunstein were only too aware of just how politically charged the
decision was. The guilt of the accused was not in question, but it was
highlighted that Tolsdorff, ‘like the overwhelming majority of the
Officer Corps, did not approve of National Socialism and its inten-
tion to infiltrate the Wehrmacht politically’. While he was described as
having become a tool of Hitler, this was the result of his limited out-
look and concentration on his purely military duties. Moreover, the
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Generalleutnant Tolsdorff in Traunstein’, SZ, 24 June 1954; ‘Der Tolsdorff-
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verdict concluded with the remark that Tolsdorff’s action represent-
ed one of the few exceptions when the usual rules of chivalry and
correctness were broken. It was also noted that the ‘good reputation
of the German Wehrmacht and its correct behaviour during the war’
was now being acknowledged once again in the formerly occupied
countries.35
This is not to say that there was no criticism of the Wehrmacht at
this time. Newspapers did contain critical comment on trials of for-
mer junior officers, while generals were still subject to verbal attacks
in articles and editorials. This trial, however, had an unwelcome
political dimension because of the pressure which veterans were still
exerting on the government. The argument ran that Germans could
not be expected to don a uniform in the new armed forces when war
veterans, with numerous wounds and as many decorations, were
being subjected to legal prosecution for simply having carried out
their duty. Veterans also pointed out that trials by German courts
could jeopardize the efforts for the release of those former soldiers
still in Allied captivity. Likewise, the suggestion that the state prose-
cutors in Traunstein had been put under pressure to secure a convic-
tion was one which certain veterans’ groups were only too happy to
make.36
Although veterans appeared angered at the court’s decision, by
June 1954 the emotions surrounding the war criminals issue were not
running nearly as high as they had been in 1951 and 1952. In fact, over
the following year the atmosphere in Western Germany was to change
radically. This can be seen in a report on the decision in June 1955 of
the Federal Court of Appeal to overturn the original sentence. The
Traunsteiner Wochenblatt, which had studiously avoided any criticism
of Tolsdorff in June 1954, noted with satisfaction that attempts by the
generals’ lawyers to have the case transferred to another court had
failed. More significantly, the paper remarked dryly that the Appeal
Court had ‘directed the assize court in Traunstein towards every point
and legal provision on the basis of which Tolsdorff’s crime could be
assessed differently, whether the assessment led to a verdict of not
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guilty, or to a decision to invoke an amnesty’.37 These were very dif-
ferent tones to those of June 1954. What had caused the change?
Between September 1954 and February 1955, a veritable wave of
anti-military sentiment swept the Federal Republic. The main cata-
lyst appears to have been the rejection of the European Defence
Community treaty by the French parliament on 30 August 1954,
which sparked the resurgence of anti-rearmament groups. It was fur-
ther fuelled by regional elections. Popular culture, in particular the
novel 08/15 by Hans Hellmuth Kirst, released as a film in September
1954, and the release of the film version of Carl Zuckmayer’s suc-
cessful play, Des Teufels General, in February 1955, interacted with
more general political developments, sowing the seeds of a new pop-
ular political culture which was demonstratively anti-military.
Above all, the return to German soil on 30 January 1955 of Field
Marshal Ferdinand Schörner, reputed to have been one of the most
brutal army commanders in the Wehrmacht, unleashed a wave of hys-
teria, numerous press reports appearing on the crimes he was alleged
to have committed.38
The nature of the change in the climate of public opinion is a most
interesting event in the history of the Federal Republic. Although
here we are dealing primarily with the reactions to Germany’s mili-
tary past, the change seems to go much deeper and to be of a more
fundamental nature than many historians have realized. Hans Ehlert
has pointed to the rejection of the European Defence Community
treaty by the French parliament as a major factor in the upsurge of
anti-military feeling and in rekindling hope among anti-rearmament
groups that they might be able to hinder the creation of new armed
forces. His conclusions appear to be well buttressed by the evidence
of public opinion polls, which identify a clear rise in anti-rearma-
ment—and hence, by implication, anti-military—feeling between
September 1954 and February 1955. While he notes the part played
by emotions, his analysis concentrates on mainstream political
debates and controversies.39
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In dealing with attitudes to the past and the strange currents
which affect them, historians have, though, generally underestimat-
ed the psychological impact of ‘non-political events’. It may well be
the case that a psychological ‘turning point’ of some importance was
Germany’s 3-2 victory over Hungary in the football World Cup Final
in Berne on 4 July 1954. The emotions it produced seem to have
marked a form of inner release from the oppressive atmosphere of
the early 1950s. The aggressive defensiveness of Germans towards
the occupying powers and the world at large, based on a feeling that
they were permanently being accused of something, was cast off. For
the first time since the end of the war Germans felt that it was possi-
ble to have pride in themselves. The Deutsche Michel, portrayed until
this point in caricatures as down-at-the-heel, under-nourished, with
bowed head, and cap in hand, before the reproving figure of an
Allied occupation official, was now able to walk tall, at least in the
world of international sport. Not without good reason was the 3-2
victory subsequently described in quasi-religious terms as the Wun-
der von Bern.40
In terms of Vergangenheitsbewältigung the event is of considerable
interest because the feelings of release which the victory caused may
well have assisted many Germans in the following months in freeing
themselves from their defensive attitude towards the past. With their
pride and self-esteem at least partially restored, there was a willing-
ness to start to deal with the events of the war and the crimes of the
past themselves. With the new positive perception of their own
national identity, the points had been changed within German socie-
ty. All that was required now was for the anti-rearmament express to
speed down the track and veer off in a new direction. At the very
least, the victory in Berne acted as a catalyst. If one accepts this the-
sis, then the Tolsdorff trial of June 1954 represents, as such, the last
important event in the second phase of the process of coming to
terms with the military past.
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III. The Shift in Public Opinion and the Three Major Trials
The new anti-military attitude among the population, politicians,
and in the press which had established itself by early 1955 was not a
fleeting phenomenon. It can be seen clearly in the press coverage of
the proceedings against Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner in
Munich in October 1957, the first retrial of Theodor Tolsdorff in
September 1958, and the trial of Hasso von Manteuffel in Düsseldorf
in August 1959. The extent of the press coverage was much greater
than during the 1954 Tolsdorff trial, and the trials of Schörner and
Manteuffel experienced wide coverage in the popular press, turning
them into major media events. Given the attention which these three
cases generated, it is worth examining each in more detail.
In the case of Ferdinand Schörner,41 despite the fact that during
1955 he had enjoyed the status of ‘Public Enemy No. 1’, especially in
the illustrated weeklies, the court proceedings represented a new
development in attitudes to the Wehrmacht: here a Field Marshal was
being put on trial by his fellow countrymen. In keeping with his rep-
utation, the reports in the press were suitably critical. Schörner’s
apparent memory loss in relation to the two cases for which he was
being tried was subjected to ridicule, this ridicule being extended to
the chief defence witness, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. While
some more conservative newspapers, such as the Frankfurter Allge-
meine Zeitung, chose not to comment on the sentence of four-and-a-
half years, others made the most of the opportunity to attack what
they saw as the perfect symbol of a ‘Nazi general’. Writing in the Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, Ernst Müller-Meiningen talked of the ‘rasping casi-
no tones’ of the Field Marshal which had begun ‘to grate on civilian
nerves’. In another article, punning on the German word ‘Brillant’, he
accused Schörner of having become corrupted by awards, stating
that the award of ‘diamonds to the Knight’s Cross did not make a
brilliant Knight’ (‘Brillanten zum Ritterkreuz noch lange keinen bril-
lanten Ritter ausmachen’). The article was accompanied by a cartoon
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which showed a hand opening up the Field Marshal’s head to reveal
a pistol and a pile of iron crosses inside.42
But the press coverage did not focus only on the person, one could
say the caricature, of Schörner. During the preliminary investiga-
tions, and during the trial itself, the role of military judges in the
Wehrmacht awakened considerable interest. In April 1956 it had
emerged that the man in the Ministry of Defence put in charge of
gathering evidence against the Field Marshal had actually been a sen-
ior military judge at his Army Group Headquarters. It was also
reported that four former military judges were not sworn in by the
court as witnesses because of suspicion that they had been involved
in some of the offences. Der Spiegel noted that the four men were now
leading civilian court officials in Oldenbourg, Hamburg, Berlin, and
Bückeburg. For the more astute observers the trial had directed atten-
tion for the first time to the fact that military judges had been able to
continue their careers unhindered after the war: ‘the military judges
of yesterday and at the same time the legal colleagues of today’, as
the Süddeutsche Zeitung put it.43
The following year saw the first of two retrials of Theodor
Tolsdorff. This trial ended with the case being abandoned under the
provisions of the Amnesty Law. Much more significant than the
court’s decision was the press reaction to the case, in particular the
strong criticism of the verdict. Indeed, in the build-up to the trial, and
in the reports on the courtroom proceedings, the press coverage dif-
fered quite dramatically from that during the first trial in June 1954.
There were, in fact, several dimensions to the proceedings which
caught journalists’ attention.
For one, there were the obvious parallels with another trial being
held at the same time in Nuremberg, where a former SS-Hauptsturm-
führer, Heinz Müller, stood accused of manslaughter, likewise for
having ordered an execution shortly before the end of the war. His
defence was also based on the infamous ‘flag order’. While no news-
paper went so far as to suggest directly that one of the most highly
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decorated officers in the Wehrmacht was no better than an SS general,
the similarities between the two cases were highlighted in some
reports, and can only have led many readers to draw this conclusion
for themselves.44
The obvious implications of the case for contemporary military
policy also caught the eye. The fact that Bundeswehr manœuvres
were taking place in the Traunstein area at the time of the trial was
picked up by many journalists. More than one newspaper mentioned
that an observer from the Ministry of Defence was present in the
courtroom, as there was apparently interest in employing Tolsdorff
in the new armed forces. There seemed to be a remarkable contem-
porary relevance to a general being tried for manslaughter, while
outside the courtroom soldiers of the new armed forces were carry-
ing out manœuvres. The concern was that there was still apparently
a very real danger that old Wehrmacht commanders would simply
take up where they had left off in May 1945.45
But perhaps the most striking element in the reporting was the
emotional reference to the victim in the case, Franz Xaver Holzhey. It
is noticeable that several reports began or concluded with the words
which were on Grave No. 314 in the military cemetery on a hill over-
looking Eisenärzt, the village where the execution had taken place:
‘He died for Eisenärzt.’ The Frankfurter Rundschau, in describing the
soldiers’ cemetery where Holzhey was buried, stated that they did
not know whether the man who had appointed himself as the ‘mer-
ciless judge’ over an old war hero from the First World had ever been
to pay his respects to his victim. ‘Probably not’, they concluded, ‘as
the Generalleutnant a.D. ... would be too proud.’ Die Welt, in an arti-
cle which used the words on the gravestone as its headline, cited
Landgerichtsdirektor Schmidt, who told witnesses from Eisenärzt that
‘Holzhey put himself in the firing line for you’.46
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Even more telling were the reactions to the verdict. The question
of Tolsdorff’s responsibility for his actions was taken up by several
newspapers. An editorial in the Frankfurter Rundschau took the court
to task for the way in which it had seen the accused’s military record
as somehow compensating for his actions, and for its failure to decide
whether the ‘flag order’ had been legally binding. In the Süddeutsche
Zeitung, Ernst Müller-Meiningen was as blunt as he had been during
the Schörner case, remarking sarcastically, ‘if it was alright to pro-
claim an SS-General Simon not guilty, why should one not give
General Tolsdorff at least an amnesty’. For the journalist, it seemed
that ‘one did not want—for military-psychological reasons, so to
say—to hurt a “branch” which is making a comeback: the military.
What a weak people, who on 3 May 1945, when the “Tolsdorff Case”
occurred, did not want to fight resolutely for “Führer und Vater-
land”.’ He accused the court in Traunstein of having ‘made every-
thing just a little too easy for itself’, and concluded that Tolsdorff’s act
remained, ‘as it was committed on 3 May 1945, straightforward mur-
der’. This editorial was supported visually by a cartoon drawn by
Ernst Maria Lang, entitled ‘Pilatus Tolsdorff & Co.’. It showed the
general washing his hands in a bowl with the word ‘Amnesty’ on it,
which was being held by a kneeling judge wearing a pious expres-
sion.47
Following the retrial of Tolsdorff, another major case came to
court the following year, this time in Düsseldorf, proving to be just as
spectacular as the proceedings against Schörner. Former General der
Panzertruppe Hasso von Manteuffel48 was charged with having
ordered an execution, again without having followed the correct
legal procedures. The trial hit the headlines throughout Western
Germany because Manteuffel was not considered to be a ‘Nazi gen-
eral’, but rather a model citizen of the new republic. One of the first
advocates of rearmament, he had also been active as a spokesman for
veterans’ organizations. Moreover, he had been elected to the
German Parliament in 1953 as a member for the Free Democrats, and
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had played a prominent role in security debates as a member of the
parliamentary select committee on defence affairs. But in 1957 it
emerged that while commanding the 7th Panzer Division on the
Russian Front in January 1944 he had ordered a soldier to be shot,
overturning the decision of a court martial which had initially sen-
tenced the soldier to two years’ prison for failing to open fire on a
Russian patrol. It was once again a case of an illegal execution. Once
again the court wrestled with the problem of ‘catastrophe orders’. In
reaching a verdict of guilty, the jury decided on eighteen months’
prison.
Even before the trial had begun, some newspapers expressed
reservations, the conservative paper Das Deutsche Wort writing: ‘The
question remains whether one can, fifteen years on, from the securi-
ty of Düsseldorf in summer, assess how a general should have acted
in the January days of 1944 on the Eastern Front—under completely
different mental and physical conditions.’ In the days following the
decision, numerous newspapers passed comment on the verdict. On
balance, the majority were critical. The Rheinische Post, for example,
took issue with the court’s view that Manteuffel had a responsibility
to inform himself of the exact wording of the ‘Führer Order No. 7’,
commenting sarcastically: ‘In defensive battles, menial clerks and
lawyers were not in demand.’ In describing the verdict as ‘harsh’, it
concluded that ‘no war can be judged by the standards of peace’. One
journalist from a smaller, regional newspaper argued that
Manteuffel’s action needed to be interpreted as stemming from his
feelings of responsibility for the situation at the front and the need to
rescue as many men as possible from the advancing Russians. He
could not be viewed as a ‘Nazi general’, and it was argued: ‘Nor was
he a general who would later have gone into captivity wearing Leder-
hosen.’ This last remark was a reference to Schörner, who had been
captured by the Americans wearing Bavarian attire.49
The claim that Manteuffel had not been a ‘Nazi general’ and could
not be compared to Schörner indicates that the trial had thrown up a
critical question, one which had effectively already been posed by the
second Tolsdorff trial. Although the debates on the founding of new
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armed forces in the period 1950–4 had led to the view that only a
minority of Wehrmacht generals had been supporters of Hitler and
the regime, that they were ‘Nazi generals’, first the Tolsdorff case and
then the proceedings against Manteuffel raised the unpleasant
thought that perhaps the views of Schörner on military discipline
had actually been held by the majority of Wehrmacht generals. Even
if this question was not posed openly, it could be found between the
lines in many reports, particularly during the Manteuffel trial.
Despite all the attempts to defend Manteuffel, the genie was now out
of the bottle.
Indeed, there were several newspapers which, given their support
of the verdict, seemed to have decided that there was not very much
difference between Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel. The Frank-
furt Abendpost argued that in the light of the evidence presented, ‘no
other judgement was possible’ because ‘even when here it was
“only” a question of a single young person ... in the name of human-
ity, which even in wartime cannot be allowed to disappear, no
acquittal could have been passed’. The Frankfurter Rundschau was
more aggressive: ‘What sort of person takes the judgement of a—cer-
tainly not squeamish—court martial ... and turns it with the stroke of
a pen into a death sentence!’ It went on to pose the rhetorical ques-
tion as to why Manteuffel had not been shot for failing to hold the
town of Shepetovka since he had, after all, sought to justify the death
sentence by arguing that it needed to be held at all costs.50
There was another element in the critical articles which is of
importance—the emotional focus on the victim in the case. The
Frankfurter Rundschau had noted that no one had remembered the
soldier’s name: ‘The general also does not know the name of the man
he had shot. But the general knows the “Führer Order No. 7”—and
sleeps well.’ The Süddeutsche Zeitung picked up on the youth of the
soldier who had been executed. In an article entitled ‘The General
and the Soldier’, Ernst Müller-Meiningen dramatically portrayed the
scene of the execution. The youth of today were criticized for being
too violent, yet this soldier had been shot for not being violent
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enough. He stood accused of cowardice in the face of the enemy, yet
‘he refused to have a blindfold bound around his eyes, and died with
astounding composure ... a young man, a child, barely nineteen years
old.’ And, accusingly, the journalist demanded: ‘What is a coward,
Herr General?’ The attack on Manteuffel was then extended to all
generals.51
This new found interest in the victim, first identifiable in the
Tolsdorff trial of September 1958, may have helped prepare the way
mentally for the remarkable success enjoyed by the anti-war film, Die
Brücke. Released just two months after the Manteuffel verdict, on 22
October 1959, the film portrayed teenage soldiers—ordered to
defend an unimportant bridge, some dying in the process—as young
victims of war. What seems significant about this milestone in West
German popular culture was that its message had already been con-
firmed in advance as ‘historically accurate’ by the Manteuffel trial.
Thus, by the end of 1960—with Manteuffel’s appeal having been
rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal, and the second Tolsdorff
retrial completed—a process of transformation in public attitudes
towards Wehrmacht generals, and arguably towards the Wehrmacht
itself, had taken place. The Tolsdorff trial of 1954, the Schörner trial,
the first Tolsdorff retrial, and the Manteuffel trial did not only reflect
changing attitudes, they also helped to form them.
IV. The ‘Generals’ Trials’ and Attitudes to the Wehrmacht
It is not, of course, being suggested here that the trials were the sole
or necessarily the dominant factor in forming perceptions of the
Wehrmacht, even in the latter half of the 1950s. But the fact that they
interacted with other trials, the depictions of officers in films such as
08/15 and Die Brücke and, above all, with the debates on rearmament
and military reform, makes plain that at the very least they can offer
important insights into the dynamics of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in
the Adenauer era. Specifically, when all eight ‘generals’ trials’ are
considered together, a number of conclusions can be drawn which
have an obvious relevance for the issue of the alleged ‘myth’ of a
‘clean Wehrmacht’, which supposedly achieved an unassailable posi-
tion in West German society in the 1950s.
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The first and most obvious is that the trials highlight the remark-
able sea-change in public opinion which took place between
September 1954 and February 1955. While the first three trials were
barely noticed, the Tolsdorff trial did provoke a surprising degree of
media coverage. However, the fact that the reactions to the Tolsdorff
trial were decidedly negative shows that public opinion had not yet
turned the corner. But the anti-military attitudes which could be
identified during the Schörner trial of October 1957, the Tolsdorff
trial of 1958, and the Manteuffel trial of 1959, indicate that a funda-
mental shift in attitude towards the military past took place in the
late 1950s. The degree of interest which the later trials provoked—
reports appearing not just in the quality press but also in popular
daily and evening papers—suggests that they not only confirm how
strong the change in attitude was, but also that they contributed to it.
Secondly, in the reorientation of attitudes towards the Wehrmacht
during the second half of the 1950s, the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and
Manteuffel trials played a key role precisely because they took place
at a time when the number of convictions for National Socialist
crimes had sunk to an all-time low.52 Until now, it has been assumed
that there was not much interest in confronting the past in the second
half of the decade because the number of trials sank noticeably dur-
ing this period. This assumption seems, however, to be based on the
notion that a ‘productive period’ in dealing with the past was
dependent on an ‘adequate number’ of cases reaching the courtroom.
As the eight ‘generals’ trials’ illustrate, such an interpretation seems
to ignore almost completely the role of public opinion, which was
much less responsive to the number of trials and more affected by
specific and, arguably, spectacular cases. Moreover, as the Schörner,
Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel proceedings took place at this time of low
legal activity, they did not have to compete for newspaper column
space, allowing them to become major media events. Likewise, the
fact that these three cases all took place within a year of each other
seems to have produced a form of cumulative effect, the scepticism
which Schörner’s defence strategy provoked being carried over to the
Tolsdorff and Manteuffel trials.
Thirdly, the remarkable impact of the trials which took place from
1954 on can only be fully understood if one takes into account the dif-
40
Articles
52 ‘Vorwort’, Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, i, p. v.
ferent levels at which they functioned, the way in which they fulfilled
different psychological needs, and what they revealed about the
Wehrmacht and its relationship to National Socialism. At one level
they seem to have satisfied the desire of many people to work
through their own experience of military justice during the final
months of the war. They provided an impetus for citizens to identify
with the victim, most notably during the second Tolsdorff trial and
the Manteuffel case. At another level, they fulfilled a growing need
after 1955 for a serious discussion of the complex issue of military jus-
tice during the war. Yet at the same time they also led to a debate on
the problems of attempting to deal with the past through the courts,
specifically the re-emergence of old wartime hierarchies during the
proceedings, with all the implications that these held for the impar-
tiality of the courts.53 A further dimension was their contribution to
exposing what seemed to be the real character of the army’s com-
manders. The remarks made by some generals in unguarded
moments during the court proceedings created the impression of a
mask dropping for a few seconds, presenting a fleeting and shocking
glimpse of the true of face of the Wehrmacht, apparently revealing the
generals’ cynical attitude to human life.
Fourthly, the impact of the later trials lay to a great extent in the
unspoken assumption that they were somehow representative. The
phrase ‘the generals’ trials’ could be found in newspaper articles.54
This should not be seen as journalistic exaggeration, but more as an
indication of the effect they had had on public perceptions. There
was the implication in much of the reporting that the generals on trial
stood as representatives of the General Officer Corps as a body. By
the end of the Manteuffel and Tolsdorff proceedings, a form of mili-
tary collective guilt thesis had been established, leading not only to
deep suspicion and antipathy towards generals, but also to criticism
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53 Considerable controversy was aroused during the Manteuffel trial when
the representative of the public prosecutor, Oberstaatsanwalt Lünen, address-
ed the general by his name and not as ‘the accused’. The fact that at the
beginning of the trial Lünen had greeted Manteuffel with a handshake, and
that he had served under him during the war, led to a parliamentary ques-
tion in the North-Rhine Westphalian Landtag. (‘Das letzte Wort des Ange-
klagten’, Rheinische Post, 22 Aug. 1959; ‘Manteuffel und die Sozialdemo-
kraten’, Die Welt, 28 Oct. 1959.)
54 E.g., ‘Prozesse und kein Ende’, Die Welt, 11 June 1960.
of the Wehrmacht as an organization. The fact that respected frontline
generals were appearing in court led to the feeling that the Wehrmacht
itself was on trial.
These conclusions are quite startling as they directly contradict
some of the central assertions of recent research on Vergangenheits-
bewältigung in the 1950s, namely, that German society showed an
inability to come to terms with the past during the 1950s; that a
usable and sanitized past was created by pressure groups and old
élites; that there was a cult of victimization; and that a myth of a clean
Wehrmacht achieved a hegemonial position in West German society.
If such a dramatic turnaround in public attitudes towards the
Wehrmacht took place, it is legitimate to ask how historians could
have missed it. Furthermore, it should be asked whether there were
any additional factors which might explain the transformation in
public opinion.
At least two factors could be cited to explain the fact that histori-
ans have missed this critical sea-change in public attitudes. To begin
with, there has been a tendency to transfer the results of research on
the early 1950s directly and uncritically to the second half of the
decade.55 This tendency has been exacerbated by the problem that
possibly the key standard work, Norbert Frei’s Vergangenheitspoli-
tik,56 covers developments only up to the Amnesty Law of 1954. At
the same time, there has been a surprising fixation on ‘the state’,
seemingly viewed as the only real force behind the early attempts to
come to terms with the National Socialist past. Such an approach nat-
urally leaves public opinion, not least its unpredictability and irra-
tional oscillations, out of the equation.
However, these strange failures of historical research over the last
decade do not in themselves fully explain the remarkable transfor-
mation in attitudes towards the Wehrmacht. Yet, quite apart from the
fact that after May 1945 there had not only been voices defending the
Wehrmacht, but also consistent condemnation of its commanders in
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Mythos’; and N. Gregor, ‘ “Is he still alive, or long since dead?”: Loss, Ab-
sence and Remembrance in Nuremberg, 1945–1956’, German History, 21
(2003), pp. 183–203.
56 N. Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfänge der Bundesrepublik und die NS-Ver-
gangenheit (Munich, 1996).
the press, it should also be borne in mind that the reaction against
generals, which became more strident in February 1955, was able to
develop the intensity it did because it could draw on previous preju-
dices and beliefs from the war. After Stalingrad, a clear ‘anti-general’
attitude established itself within the German psyche, a direct product
of Goebbels’s propaganda: the generals had been responsible for
Stalingrad and other disasters in the East, not the Führer. The
longevity of this notion can be seen in the aggressive reception which
former General der Artillerie Walter von Seydlitz, one of the leading
figures in the Soviet-sponsored National Committee ‘Free Germany’
movement, received upon his return to the Federal Republic in
October 1955.57 But this reactivated Nazi attitude, although it con-
tributed to the momentum of anti-military feeling, gradually became
diluted by a greater willingness to confront the past, made possible
in part by the attainment of sovereignty and a sense of distance
between the present and the events and experiences of the war.
There is, none the less, an obvious objection which can be made to
the argument that the ‘generals’ trials’ provide evidence of a deep
change in perceptions of the Wehrmacht from the mid-1950s onwards.
Given that the trials were all for executions of German soldiers, some
would argue that this is simply another example of post-war West
German attempts to create a political culture of ‘victimization’.58
However, this objection is unconvincing for several reasons. To begin
with, the fact that the courts only prosecuted generals for crimes
against their own soldiers was, quite apart from unavoidable politi-
cal considerations, partly a result of Allied laws, which initially for-
bade German courts from trying cases involving anything other than
crimes committed against Germans and stateless citizens.59 How-
ever, the identification with the victim in the later trials represented
a clear departure from earlier attitudes for two reasons: first, to iden-
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57 E.g., ‘Schweigen Sie, General von Seydlitz’, Schwäbische Rundschau, 15 Oct.
1955.
58 For examples of this interpretation, M. L. Hughes, ‘ “Through no Fault of
our Own”: West Germans Remember their War Losses’, German History, 18
(2000), pp. 193–213, and R. G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past
in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, 2001).
59 The final removal of the restrictions imposed by Allied laws took place at
the end of August 1951 (Streim, ‘Saubere Wehrmacht?’, pp. 572–5).
tify with the victim meant taking sides against a former ‘state offi-
cial’; and second, by unleashing intense emotions, it broke the culture
of silence and denial which characterized the early 1950s. The impli-
cations of accepting the guilt of the generals were considerable,
implying at the very least an admission that the Wehrmacht did not
have a clean record. Moreover, the efforts to create ‘victim identity’
were undertaken by those who sought to maintain and perpetuate
the value system of the Volksgemeinschaft, embodied in many ways by
the culture and demands of the Heimkehrerverband. But the attempt to
perpetuate ‘victim status’ drew much of its political raison d’être from
the claim that the Allies were treating the Germans unfairly. With the
attainment of sovereignty and the release of the last large group of
POWs from the USSR in 1955, two of the main planks supporting the
feelings of victimization broke away.
To understand the change in perceptions also requires, beyond an
awareness of the change in political and societal climate in 1954–5,
one to take note of the intensification of criticism which occurred
during the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel trials. Cartoons pub-
lished in newspapers and journals can provide some important
insights into decoding the changing connotations and symbols which
the trials provoked. One which provides a useful starting point
appeared in Simplicissimus in February 1955, illustrating the return of
Schörner from Russian captivity. The Field Marshal is depicted walk-
ing down an alley of damaged trees, lined with veterans in Wehr-
macht uniforms. Three figures on crutches are visible, one an am-
putee. In the foreground is the figure of a woman, obviously a
widow. From the trees hang a number of empty nooses. Schörner
comments that his military police have obviously slipped up. The
geographical location is a specific one: somewhere in Czechoslovakia
towards the end of the war, where mass hangings were alleged to
have taken place on Schörner’s orders. The gaunt faces of the soldiers
are striking. The Volksgemeinschaft and its victims are looking accus-
ingly at the Field Marshal.60
Yet when one compares the Simplicissimus cartoon with two by
Ernst Maria Lang of 1958, the gallows are still present, but seem to
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60 Front cover, Simplicissimus, 12 Feb. 1955, cartoon by H. M. Brockmann enti-
tled ‘Ave Schörner...’, with the caption: ‘Na, Kameraden, da scheint meine
Feldgendarmerie zum Schluß ja schön versagt zu haben!’
have taken on new connotations. In the first, dated April 1958, a bit-
ing comment on the trial of Waffen-SS General Max Simon before the
Landgericht Nuremberg-Fürth,61 the door of the court has blown
open, and the spectre of Hitler floats in the centre of the courtroom,
proclaiming ‘I was German law’. Just outside the door are armed fig-
ures from the SS and three sets of empty gallows.62 Here it can be
assumed the gallows are references to the hangings carried out by the
SS in the final months of the war. However, in the cartoon of
Tolsdorff, published four months later, in which a grinning, burly
figure in general’s uniform is pictured washing his hands in a bowl
marked ‘Amnesty’, numerous gallows can be seen in the back-
ground, which has no obvious geographical association. This time
corpses are suspended from them.63
The Tolsdorff cartoon raises an interesting question. Given that
the case for which he was tried involved an execution by firing
squad, is the cartoonist referring to the hangings carried out by the SS
in the ‘final period’ of the war on German soil? Or is it possible, given
that he served as a soldier himself on the Eastern Front, that he is
making a visual reference to the hangings of ‘partisans’ in the East,
with the underlying suggestion that the Wehrmacht was involved?
Although here we can only speculate, the latter explanation seems
more likely. Certainly, whether intended or not, many would have
understood the reference. And although it was a subject still too con-
troversial to be discussed in print in 1958, the cartoon is one indica-
tion that it was on people’s minds. Likewise, it cannot have been too
great a jump in logic to consider that if generals had been willing to
shoot their own soldiers without any compunction, they were more
than likely to have done the same with enemy personnel or civilians
in the occupied countries. This visual reference in 1958 to war crimes
committed by Germans shows just how far public perceptions had
come since 1955.
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61 1171 Ks 10/57, verdict, LG Nürnberg-Fürth, 23 April 1958, in Justiz und
NS-Verbrechen, xiv, pp. 699–727.
62 Cartoon by E. M. Lang entitled ‘Spuk in Nürnberg’, SZ, 26 April 1958, with
the caption: ‘Ich war das deutsche Recht.’
63 Cartoon by E. M. Lang entitled ‘Pilatus Tolsdorff & Co.’, SZ, 1 Oct. 1958,
with the caption: ‘... und sie waschen ihre Hände in Unschuld ... .’
V. Conclusion
This survey of eight trials of former Wehrmacht generals for execu-
tions of soldiers under their command, conducted in West German
courts between 1948 and 1960, has attempted to show that remark-
able differences can be identified in the reactions to trials which took
place before July 1954 and those thereafter up to 1960. In the pro-
ceedings against Theodor Tolsdorff, there was a dramatic difference
between the press coverage in June 1954 and September 1958,
although essentially no new details had come to light since the first
trial. It has also been suggested that a shift in societal attitudes
towards the Wehrmacht had begun even earlier than 1957, a process
of transformation occurring between September 1954 and February
1955. Thus the evidence of the trials strongly suggests that the thesis
of a ‘myth of a clean Wehrmacht’ cannot be applied to the 1950s as a
whole. There are grounds for arguing the case for the period 1950 to
mid-1954—although the matter is not quite as clear-cut as some his-
torians seem to think—but for the entire decade the thesis seems
wide of the mark.
Some might counter that the involvement of the Wehrmacht in the
Holocaust in the East was not discussed. This is, of course, correct,
but it would be a mistake to ignore the parameters of the time. It
should be remembered that in the late 1950s public awareness of the
full scale of the Holocaust was still in a formative period. Moreover,
the British and Americans only began to start returning the 350 tons
of captured Wehrmacht documents to the Federal Republic in 1959.64
What is significant is that out an atmosphere of silence and denial,
West German society made remarkable progress from 1955 onwards
in its confrontation with the Wehrmacht’s past, within the limitations
of what was then possible. The fact that this was accomplished in
part through trials which focused on relatively minor incidents
should not be seen as evidence of a failure to take the past seriously.
In the Schörner, Tolsdorff, and Manteuffel trials, a microcosm of the
war was put under the spotlight which made the problem of the
Wehrmacht’s disciplinary system, and hence the effect of National
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those held by the Americans in 1970. See H. H. Herwig, ‘An Introduction to
Military Archives in West Germany’, Military Affairs, 34 (Dec. 1972), pp.
121–4.
Socialist ideology on the military, intelligible and mentally digestible
to the ordinary citizen.
The details which emerged during the later proceedings gave the
impression that new aspects in the history of the Wehrmacht were
being brought to light for the first time. The contrast with the previ-
ous idealized image of the Wehrmacht, and the shortcomings in the
legal proceedings, infused much of the newspaper-reading public
with a new found cynicism towards the military. The ‘generals’ tri-
als’, therefore, contributed to a process of de-mythologization of the
Wehrmacht in the second half of the 1950s. This process, however
imperfect it may have been in retrospect, is of considerable impor-
tance for any broader understanding of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. It
could be argued that the trials provided German society with the
opportunity to deal psychologically with one of the traumatic expe-
riences of the war—summary executions. This was in itself an impor-
tant psychological step before the Holocaust could be seriously con-
fronted. Only when an individual’s own traumas had been dealt
with, was it then possible for him or her to confront the crimes of the
Nazi regime and the question of the guilt of German society.
In debunking the ‘myth of a clean Wehrmacht’, this article has also
sought to draw attention to the gaps in much of the research on
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. It seems remarkable that one of the central
assumptions in this field, namely that coming to terms with the past
only really began with the Ulmer Einsatzgruppenprozeß of April 1958,
has not led to any serious primary research into the reactions to this
trial. However, even a relatively cursory look at the evidence makes
plain that a change in societal values began during the second half of
the 1950s. Despite its limitations, the confrontation with Germany’s
military past at this time was of fundamental significance. When one
considers that during the Leipzig trials of ‘war accused’ (Kriegsbe-
schuldigte) in the 1920s for offences committed during the Great War
the German military judicial system effectively came to the conclu-
sion that the term ‘war crimes’ could not be applied to anyone who
had worn a German uniform,65 one begins to understand precisely to
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65 Hankel, Die Leipziger Prozesse, pp. 91–104. Moreover, Hankel shows that in
the proceedings against Field Marshal August von Mackensen and General-
leutnant a.D. Karl Stenger, the judges made it clear that they did not take
accusations of war crimes against high-ranking commanders seriously (pp.
123–42, 295–300).
what extent the ‘generals’ trials’ in the 1950s represented a major
turning point in German military and legal history.
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